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Professor Glendon ends her discussion of abortion law by saying that "[i]n the long run, the way in which we name things and
imagine them may be decisive for the way we feel and act with respect to them, and for the kind of people we ourselves become." I
would ask that she think about whether we want a return to a world
in which we imagine motherhood as compulsory, and whether that
way of "imagining the real" might indeed be "decisive for the way
we feel and act with respect" to women, with disastrous consequences for us all.

TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION. By David
A.J. Richards.' New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
1986. Pp. xvii, 348. $29.95.
MEN AND MARRIAGE. By George Gilder.2 Gretna, La.:
Pelican Publishing Company. 1986. Pp. xix, 200. $15.95.
Thomas P. Lewis 3

The only justification for reviewing these books jointly is the
study in contrasts they provide. Professor David Richards's book is
about constitutional law and judicial review. For academic philosophers, it may be an easy read, but most lawyers will find it a turgid,
prolix, and abstruse exercise in hermeneutics. George Gilder's book
is not about judicial review or the Constitution. It is a sharp, clear
anthropological statement, grounded largely in Gilder's interpretation of empirical evidence about sex roles. Each book covers substantial territory not explored in the other, but there is some overlap
of underlying subject matter. When they address the same topics,
Richards and Gilder reach markedly different conclusions. Abortion and homosexuality, for example, are constitutional issues that
both books discuss. What Professor Richards stoutly concludes are
constitutional rights, to be freely exercised in the pursuit of personal
wholeness, Gilder dismisses as the ingredients or symptoms of sexual suicide and societal ruin.
Professor of Law, New York University.
Gilder's book is a revision of his earlier SEXUAL SUICIDE (1973). In the Preface to
MEN AND MARRIAGE he says that several prominent publishers had offered to reissue SEXUAL SUICIDE, but in every case called back later "to tell me-{)r imply strongly-that protests from feminist editors had balked them."
3. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
I.

2.
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I

In the brief compass of a review I can only mention the highlights of Richards's elaborate argument. He begins simply enough
by saying that a sound interpretive approach to the Constitution
must derive from an understanding of the political theory and environment surrounding its birth. It is not enough to read the text,
along with its narrow "legislative history." Rather, we must look to
the larger philosophical and political conceptions that underlay the
Bill of Rights. Drawing on such thinkers as Locke, 4 Kant, and
Rousseau, Richards surmises that the founders grounded the Constitution on "contractarian political theory" reflecting the "moral
sovereignty of the people."
The last phrase must not be confused with "popular sovereignty," relied upon in different ways according to Richards by
Raoul Berger and James B. Thayer. The framers should not be regarded as the applicable sovereign, as Richards says Berger would
have it, because our generation should not be bound by the will of
theirs. Nor can we accept the sovereignty of the people as reflected
in legislative majorities, as Thayer suggested. Instead, the moral
sovereignty of the people in the context of contractarian theory
means that the people-presumably Richards is referring to the
founders who acted for them-conditioned constitutional government on a "conception of justice" that "aims to protect an idealized
moral conception of persons as free, rational, and equal."
Developing his interpretation of the "abstract intentions,"
"background rights," and "political and moral culture" that found
expression in the Bill of Rights, primarily the religion and free
speech clauses of the first amendment, Richards develops a conception of an "inalienable right to conscience" and its natural consequence, "universal toleration," founded on "equal respect for
persons." The enforcement of universal toleration depends upon
constitutional judicial review, proceeding from a theory of legal interpretation that "must . . . as part of its interpretive task, utilize
historical reconstruction of traditions of the community. Such a reconstruction may best define the community's sense of what its traditions now mean or should mean." The implications of the phrase
"should mean" will be clear to any careful reader: Because the
Constitution represents a "self-conscious" effort by the founders to
"use the best political [and moral] theory and political science of the
age ... to create a written text of constraints on state power," so
4. As Professor John Roche has recently noted, quoting Madison, turning to Locke is
" 'a field of research which is more likely to perplex than to decide.' " Roche, Constitutional
Scholarship, What Next?, 5 CoNST. CoMM. 21 (1988).
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continuance of the tradition requires interpretation that would call
upon the best modem political and moral theory "of an explicitly
contractarian kind." In short, the "community's sense" of its traditions is not to be determined by the community.
A key element of Richards's "historiographical" analysis is the
decision of the founders to develop a written constitution. He insists on interpreting the document; no extra-constitutional nonsense
for him. Yet he rejects any notion that the courts should apply his
interpretive theory in a clause-bound fashion. The text seems to be
important only as it reflects the founders' larger preoccupation with
certain political and moral beliefs. "General political theory" can
be used to "explicate larger interpretive patterns common to vertically disjoint constitutional texts." The founders' expression of
these patterns "grows out of a larger cultural and moral tradition
that conceives political legitimacy on a contractarian model calling
for observance by the state of predictable and orderly constraints
that acknowledge and express the dignity of persons and citizens as
free, rational, and equal."
Although Richards draws heavily on the work of classic philosophers, he believes that only selected portions of their work
should now be controlling. For Locke's contractarian theory was,
after all, associated with "economic privilege," Rousseau's has been
rejected as "totalitarian," and Kant's might make sense only as
"proto-utilitarianism." It is only the best contemporary contractarian theory that is to be enforced through judicial review. If
earlier contractarian theory is "rootedly antiredistributive, antiegalitarian, antiliberal . . . and at bottom, proto-utilitarian" a
"contemporary contractarian theory of some depth and sophistication, like Rawls's, not only makes possible a revival of nonutilitarian political philosophy, but enables us [and the Supreme
Court] to ... find a distinctive approach to political legitimacy"
which lacks these flaws.
I find this somewhat confusing. Richards avers that the will of
a long-dead generation cannot bind present generations, yet he also
believes that it can: to a conception of justice founded on the moral
sovereignty of the people in a relationship of covenant with the government, a conception to be fleshed out from time to time by a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, as they digest and
accept the best contemporary political and moral philosophy. But
there are limits, to be found in portions of Locke's, or Kant's, or
Rousseau's thoughts. Locke is there, at the founding, and he isn't.
Kant is there whether he was or not. Certainly, says Richards, we
cannot accept Locke's bigotry toward Catholics and atheists, or his
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preoccupation with property. Contrary to what Locke would countenance, Richards believes that parents have a right to send their
children to parochial schools. At the same time, any form of governmental assistance to those schools would unconstitutionally "endorse" such parental "value imposition," because it would be
contrary to the "Lockean political theory so central to the religion
clauses . . . ." "Children, for Locke, are neither the property of
their parents nor of the state, both of whom are under moral obligations to them to assure the appropriate care and development of
their moral powers," that is, their right to form their own beliefs.
Since for Richards belief formation is not limited to religious
matters, but covers the waterfront of thought, his ideas come perilously close to condemning compulsory public education as unconstitutional. He concludes, however, that it is a "general good," but
the system must "limit itself to imparting the general educational
goods that develop our rational and reasonable powers, and avoid
endorsing specific substantive conceptions that those powers should
adopt." We are not told just how this is to be done without creating
classes whose tedium will make students yearn for Latin I.
Through four chapters dealing with religion, conscience, and
speech, and two developing his major end product, a "theory of
constitutional privacy," Richards seeks to create (or to distill, for he
always has at least one foot in the past) and apply the best contractarian political and moral theory. The theme of universal toleration and equal respect is repeated over and over again, with
slightly varying phraseology. Every person has "rational" and
"moral independence": the right to exercise the "highest order twin
moral powers of rationality and reasonableness in belief formation
and revision," and the right to "the exercise of the conceptions of a
life well and ethically lived and expressive of a mature person's rational and reasonable powers." And so on. Each person may act
out these rights, subject to the state's right to protect or conserve
"general goods," for "various all-purpose general or primary goods,
including life and bodily security," are also entitled to "equal respect." General goods, sometimes called "neutral harms," cannot
depend for definition on "conventional conceptions of public morality," Locke to the contrary notwithstanding. Rather, putting moral
consensus aside, general goods are "things all persons could reasonably accept as all-purpose conditions of pursuing their aims,
whatever they are." They are "only those interests of persons
whose necessary protection is acceptable to all reasonable persons at
large." Yes, all reasonable persons: one man, one veto.
It is clear to Richards that none of this has relevance for such
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matters as the commerce clause or substantive economic due process. How he knows that those constitutional values do not require
aggressive judicial scrutiny, without first subjecting them to the
same type of "historiographical" analysis he gives to the first
amendment, is not explained. It occurs to me that the soundest part
of his analysis, the background rights idea, but with an eye on the
constitutional text, including the truism that all text must have
some purpose, would provide strong support for the dissenters in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. But Richards has other fish to fry.
In his chapters on privacy Richards deals with contraception,
abortion, and sexual autonomy as privacy rights. With respect to
the last, he is concerned principally with homosexual acts. His
treatment of abortion focuses on the general goods half of his equation to protect individual autonomy. After satisfying himself that
person-potential does not make a fetus a person (because the contrary view could be based only on nonneutral religious or metaphysical assumptions), and that therefore the "usual proscription of
homicide" does not apply to abortion, he asks whether the preservation of the fetus is an interest that could qualify as a general good.
"The lives of nonpersons . . . are not common goods of this kind."
Protection of such lives would not be viewed as "so necessary to the
lives of all rational people that each person could reasonably accept
protections of such goods by the criminal law even at the cost of
essential interests in moral independence."
Richards heroically tries to distinguish abortion restrictions
from protection of animals, infants, and senile folks. "True," he
says, "some philosophers have denied that the neonate is a person
and thus claim that infanticide does not violate anyone's natural
right to life." All we get in response is an assurance that their view
is not "inevitable," that "one may reasonably argue," and "a criterion of dissimilarity may be formulated to sort out these matters."s
Nowhere do I find Richards stating that all people would reasonably agree that protection of a retarded newborn is so "indispensable" to the "lives of all rational people that each person" would
accept it even if, for some, the effect was to destroy their independently conceived notions of lives well lived.
It might help if Richards explained more fully how judgments
5. Professor Tribe, who shares Richards's conclusion about abortion, gets there via a
somewhat different route. Along the way he has this to say: "But all normative judgments
are rooted in moral premises; surely the judgment that it is wrong to kill a two-week old
infant is no less 'moral' in inspiration than the judgment, less frequently made but no less
strongly felt by many of those who make it, that it is wrong to kill a two-day old fetus." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1350 (2d ed. 1988).
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are to be made about what all people reasonably will or will not
accept. Apparently their "votes" must be reasonable, yet it is clear
that as they weigh their choices their premises have to include, as a
control on the state, the right of every person capable of reason to
think and thus to desire to act in "evil" and "intolerant" ways. For
"moral independence" has no meaning as a right if everyone must
think and act in a "reasonable" way.6
I have tried to figure out why, though I agree with Richards
that sodomy, as such, should not be a penal offense, it nevertheless
strikes me as so incongruous to find a solemn argument for a constitutional right to engage in anal intercourse at the end of a tome
otherwise chiefly devoted to an ornate analysis of the founding era.
Perhaps it is because of my feeling that nothing could have been
further removed from the "background rights" the founders had in
mind when they drafted the Bill of Rights. Or maybe it is because
of my impression that the issue is at least partly spurious: American governments are not locking up people who are guilty only of
private, consensual sodomy. The real issue, it seems to me, is
whether the government may support the taboo against homosexuality, and if so, whether unenforced criminal laws are a permissible
means.
Richards has a broader agenda than the decriminalization of
homosexual acts, though he makes a passionate and appealing argument about the bad effects of criminalization. His aim is to persuade people that such conduct is simply an alternative lifestyle.
"The same considerations that debar the power of the state to homogenize religion or thought or speech require institutional respect
for ways of life expressive of a just moral independence." In the
case of constitutional privacy, "resources central to the independent
exercise of our moral powers are justly protected against a hostile
and homogenizing public scrutiny." Certainly this means that organized society is to be neutral; it cannot regulate, teach, or preach
to further a viewpoint. It is less clear whether Richards means also
to posit a societal obligation to protect against a hostile public scrutiny. His general goods formula might accommodate that approach, but the text of the first amendment could be a problem-for
others, if not for Richards. In any event, to support his argument
6. In connection with the similarity of Richards's approach to general or primary
goods and the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," Professor Tushnet observed: "I believe that one
of the central controversies over Rawls's approach is whether he has so stripped his rational
contractors of their human capacities as to make it incoherent to talk about what 'they'
would choose. Richards goes farther than Rawls in making his contractors, quite literally,
disembodied." Tushnet, Sex, Drugs. and Rock 'n' Roll: Some Conservative Reflections on
Liberal Jurisprudence (Book Review), 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1540 (1982).
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Richards feels bound to make the case that all forms of sexual activity are equally wholesome.
It's not easy to define a community's "tradition." Richards
would have the Court declare that our traditions require individual
moral independence. But if our traditions were really so simple,
Richards wouldn't need to write his book. Must the Court ignore
those traditions that are exceptions to our general notions of moral
laissez-faire?
II

George Gilder does not possess the imposing scholarly credentials of a Milton Friedman. But I have heard him described as the
Milton Friedman of sexual sociology-conservative, brilliant, partisan, dogmatic, lucid, and anathema to many professors of constitutional law. His message is simple: "Monogamy is central to any
democratic social contract, designed to prevent a breakdown of society .... " This conclusion follows from Gilder's analysis of male
sexuality and what he regards as crucial differences between the
male and the female, whose sexual superiority is quite simply "the
prime fact of life." The woman is complete; her sexuality is diffused
throughout her body, and her sexual identity so unimpeachable as
to be taken for granted by her. The man's role, by contrast, makes
him more dispensable, and hence less secure. But his male identity
will be asserted somehow. "Voluminous" evidence reveals that hormonal influences shape men and women differently, men being
more aggressive, violent, muscular, competitive, and less nurturant,
moral, and stable. As societies moved from the male-as-hunter
model to the male-as-farmer model, a movement that Gilder says
anthropologists frequently credit to women, the problem that Margaret Mead called the "central issue" of every society arose: "what
to do with the males." Gilder's answer, developed at some length,
is that the male's masculinity must be tamed, his barbarian nature
must be socialized, and this is accomplished through subjecting it to
female patterns, via monogamous marriage and family responsibilities. Central to this process, says Gilder, is maintenance of the
male-as-provider model. Much of the book is devoted to description of what he sees as the consequences for society of a breakdown
in this pattern. The picture he draws is not pretty: crime, violence,
drugs, homosexuality, and despair.
Gilder paints an especially drab picture of male homosexuality,
proceeding from premises that differ in almost every detail from
those of Richards. For Richards, homosexuality is a fixed and
largely immutable condition; for Gilder this is a myth that is "the
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most powerful tool of the homosexual culture." Where Richards
can find no evidence of harm from sodomy, Gilder cites startling
statistics of infectious diseases among male homosexuals in the
1980s, charging that the "liberal journalists," "pliable psychologists," and "pandering politicians," among others, "who condoned
the most extreme homosexual behavior as an acceptable life-style
are the true sources of the AIDS epidemic."
For Gilder, however, homosexuality is not the root problem
(though for too many it means a squalid life), but rather a symptom
and part of a larger problem: the breakdown of monogamy. Because he believes an "enormous number of homosexuals have
clearly been recruited from the ranks of the physically normal," he
would not relax the social pressures in favor of heterosexuality.
"This emphatically does not mean harassing or imprisoning homosexuals." (It occurs to me that such compromises may be our dominant tradition: we create taboos and withhold approval; yet we
tacitly recognize a liberty interest.)
The real problem, says Gilder, is single men. Their image is
glamorous: "freedom and power"; "The naked nomad in the bedrooms of the land. . . . The hero of the film and television drama;
cool, violent, sensuous, fugitive, free." The reality, recognizing that
there are millions of exceptions: "Violence and crime join with
mental illness, mild neurosis, depression, addiction, AIDS, institutionalization, poverty, unemployment, and nightmares to comprise
the specialized culture of single men in America. . . . Of all groups,
single males have the highest mortality rate-and suicide is increasingly the way they die."
Gilder's statistics are impressive. But do men have the
problems because they are single or are they single because they
have the problems? Gilder seeks to make the case that singleness is
the cause and marriage is the cure. Along the way he observes that
while blacks as perpetrators and victims account for almost half of
all violent crimes, "the central facts about crime are not racial; they
are sexual."
Like the radical feminists, Gilder sees men as violent. While
the radical feminists want to escape from the beast, however, Gilder
wants to tame him. For the radical feminists, marriage and children are chains for women, and therefore bad. For Gilder, they are
civilizing links for men, and therefore good.
Gilder is somewhat more specific in identifying the sources of
the problem than he is in proposing remedies. The alleged sources
include social, economic, and educational policies that Gilder sees
as contributing to a breakdown in monogamy and two-parent fami-
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lies. Among the policies that have this effect are: 1) those that encourage women to leave the home for careers, or worse, make it
economically difficult if not impossible for them to choose the home
and child care as their role; 2) welfare programs that dissolve "the
ties that bind men to their children" (and, incidentally, have a disproportionate effect on black family formation); 3) educational policies, including coeducation, especially in the early grades, and jobs
and defense policies that ignore or seek to obliterate differences between the sexes; and 4) attitudes, laws, and technical breakthroughs
that increase the woman's control of procreation.
Gilder finds more implications in each of these trends than
would meet the eye of the casual observer. All have to do with sex
roles and the problems that result if large numbers of males find
their sexual identity outside marriage and family. Gilder insists
that men and women have different and essential sex roles, in relation to work, sports, combat, and the home. They have different
interests, mature at different rates, and hence learn and excel in different ways. The man's role as chief provider and the woman's role
as chief nurturer are crucial; they are not merely cultural conventions. "[Steven] Goldberg's rigorously argued The Inevitability of
Patriarchy refutes every anthropological claim that there has ever
existed in human affairs either a society where women rule, or a
society where final authority resides with them in male-female relations." To try to ignore sexual differences, says Gilder, is to try to
abolish human nature.
I gather that the remedies Gilder would endorse include a radical departure from established welfare policy, remaining steadfast in
restricting combat roles to males, ending the right to abortion on
demand, and holding the line on further expansion of coeducation.
Notably absent is any overt call for a repeal of laws forbidding sex
discrimination in employment. Perhaps this is because he believes
the evidence shows that sex roles in employment generally persist,
and his welfare reform proposal would remove some of the economic incentives that lead so many women to leave the home for
work. His proposal, developed in a chapter aptly titled "Supporting
Families," is borrowed from Patrick Moynihan and the experience
of some countries, notably France and Japan. He calls for strengthening all families through a rather complex scheme of "family allowances" related to children in the home.

III
As an abstraction, the individual right of moral autonomy is
appealing and almost universally accepted in this country. But how
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to give concrete content to the right from time to time, when it is
asserted as a justification for behavior in various contexts, is another
matter indeed. A crucially important subquestion, how responsibility for the task is allocated in our constitutional system, cannot be
answered by moral philosophers. Richards's approach to "interpretation" of the Constitution is philosophical sleight of hand, designed
to maintain the pretense of interpretation while the text of the document is being stripped of any function as a constraint on the
Justices.
If it is not pretentious to claim that there are "best" moral and
political philosophies, it is dangerous to suppose that Supreme
Court Justices are the people best suited to find and enforce them.
Richards confuses what the founders thought about moral philosophy with what they thought (or would have thought) about giving
open-ended judicial review to life-tenured Justices. After all, the
founders' credentials as political architects were considerably more
impressive than their credentials as moral philosophers. So even if
Professor Richards is right about their values, and the implications
of those values for modern issues, I see no reason to reject their
system of government in order to enforce their system of philosophy. If anything about the Court emerged with clarity from our
founding history, it was that the Justices were not to be a Council of
Revision. And what emerges with clarity from our larger history is
that morality and the shaping of our traditions are the subjects of
continuing debate. Our moral traditions are always in a state of
becoming. All of this strongly suggests the wisdom of renewing one
of our most fundamental political traditions: expecting legislators
to take seriously questions about who we as a people are and ought
to strive to be. Again, history suggests that legislators can be as
eloquent in these respects as the Court. 1
I cannot imagine why Richards or anyone else would choose
Richards's approach to constitutional law, except to obtain specific
judicial decisions that they cherish. He says that orderly and predictable constraints on government were intended. But when his
approach is brought to bear on specific issues it does not contribute
to predictability. At least I could not discern where he was going
7. A well done reminder on this point is Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of
the Founeenth Amendment, I CONST. COMM. 235 (1984). The authors review the natural
law thought (background interests?) that was pervasive during the country's founding and
later, from the 1850s through the drafting of the fourteenth amendment. Locke's views were
still influential, as were the ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Private contracts and property were prominent among the concepts claimed by influential writers of the
times to be recognized by even a "higher law" than the Constitution. But what also shows
through, at least as a matter of expression, are the ideals of equality and human dignity.
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on many occasions until he told me. He argues, for example, that
the state cannot, in any way, assist parental provision of parochial
education. How could we predict that five Justices would select this
theory of the parent-child-state relationship as the best? Or take
another example: Would the reader who has not encountered the
idea elsewhere guess that "equal respect" means that newspapers
must be treated as public forums, with fair and equal access to all?
For Richards, part of the constitutional text is everything, part
is without real meaning, and part provides a launching pad. But his
model of interpretation would appear to be as sound for all constitutional provisions as it is for any. The scope of background rights
and interests surely varies from provision to provision, but the "best
political and moral theory," even of a contractarian kind, covers a
lot of ground. Would it be a fair test of Richards's position to put
George Gilder on the Court and ask him to follow Richards's general interpretive theory? This idea is not wholly fanciful; after all,
those who share Gilder's substantive world view probably outnumber those who share Richards's,s and Richards's "Constitution"
doesn't need lawyers to interpret it.
What sorts of background rights might Justice Gilder ascribe
to the founders? What might he determine to be the best contemporary political and moral theory in a variety of contexts? Gilder professes to stand in awe of women. His professed aim is to protect
them from the aggressions of men. Women and weak men (weak in
economic power or other attributes that allow some men to be seen
as "powerful") are the tragic losers, says Gilder, when there is a
breakdown in monogamy. Attractive, young women also prosper,
but only while their beauty lasts. Monogamy, according to Gilder,
is not merely the most desirable of several tolerable social arrangements. As a core value it is the sine qua non of an enduring and
bearable society. As a legislator, Gilder would not make homosexual conduct a crime, but where would he line up as a Justice? Richards's moral theory leads naturally to a "suspect criterion"
(immutable characteristic), "compelling interest" analysis that
would outlaw discrimination against homosexuals. The same jurisprudential framework, however, might lead a Gilder, convinced
that the taboo against homosexuality is exceedingly valuable, to up8. John Ely and Mark Tushnet have noted the tendency of scholars such as Richards
to reflect a preoccupation with interests and rights of first importance to what, for shorthand
purposes, could be called the liberal elite, or more broadly in Ely's phrase, the "upper· middle
professional class." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980); Tushnet, supra note 6
passim. Though Gilder as a Harvard graduate is surely a member of this latter class, his
concern is with an undifferentiated population, with a recurring focus on poor and average
persons.
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hold even criminal sanctions against homosexual acts, knowing full
well that they will hardly ever be employed.
Richards's argument for abortion on demand would be beside
the point for Gilder, who insists that procreative power is a prime
source of male affirmation. Gilder believes that the psychological
consequences of placing complete control of procreation in the woman are profound. He contends that the voters have repeatedly refused to endorse broad liberalization of the abortion laws because it
is an issue that psychologically underlies the "sexual constitution"
regarding "sexuality, children and the family." They "instinctively
recognize that preservation of the sexual constitution may be even
more important to the social order than preservation of the legal
constitution," for "no law can prevail against the dissolution of the
social connections and personal motivations that sustain a civilized
polity." Richards dismisses arguments against abortion based on
sexuality and sex roles, because they are grounded in a moral conception of the good life. They are therefore nonneutral and cannot
support regulation as a general good. But for Gilder it is not just a
matter of morals; it is a matter of civilization versus anarchy.
Moreover, Richards's general goods concept does not flow from his
interpretive theory; it flows from his "best" contemporary substantive theory, which his interpretive theory permits him to construct.9
Gilder could be expected to add a distinct layer to the background
rights assumed by the founders, who after all had a viewpoint about
sex roles that was much closer to Gilder's than to Richards's. We
need not conclude that the founders' viewpoint was rejected in toto
when a particular expression of it was repudiated by the nineteenth
amendment. In Gilder's universe no one-certainly no heterosexual woman-could count on being one of the few "winners" from a
breakdown in monogamy, so the protections he would find essential
9. Frequently the debate centering on writers such as Rawls or Richards focuses on
whether a given rendition of moral philosophy is "right." Challenging a statement by Professor Ely that a method of moral philosophy simply does not exist, Professor Michael Glennon
writes that disagreement with Rawls does not mean that Rawls is wrong. Perhaps the critics
are wrong. "Democracy may be a great idea, but you can't decide whether a particular moral
philosophy is 'fine' (to use Ely's word) through the use of public opinion." Glennon, Pe1'SOna/
Autonomy in Democracy and Distrust, I CoNST. CoMM. 229, 230 (1984). But if the Supreme
Court decides Rawls is wrong, or screws up his theories, it will be open to others to say the
Justices are wrong, but it may not do much good. As Justice Jackson observed, the Justices
do not have the last word because they are infallible, but they are infallible because they have
the last word. Returning to Richards, it is also necessary to remember that he devotes a
substantial portion of his book to articulating the interpretive approach that can justify plugging Rawls into the Constitution. But the approach does not dictate that; using the same
approach, the Justices could plug in wholly unrelated concepts under various constitutional
provisions and ignore Rawls.
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to maintenance of monogamy might in his view be acceptable to all
reasonable people.
Richards does not simply suggest the propriety of his interpretive approach; he would regard a failure to adopt it as irresponsible.
He might change his mind if we had a Court of Justice Gilders,
peppering the U.S. Reports with passages like this:
There is, in fact, only one fully documented case surviving in the modern world of a
tribe so abjectly retarded, or so mystically impervious to its own nature, that it
simultaneously rejects and tries to abolish all three of these [universal] human characteristics--sex roles, religion and property rights. That group, not even strictly
speaking a tribe, is, of course, the community of social science scholars in America.

There is much more to Richards's thesis than meets his eye.
One need not accept all of Gilder's arguments (I don't) to
profit from consideration of his underlying premise. Even those of
ardent feminist persuasion, female and male, are likely to be reminded of a good many obvious facts. Gilder makes it clear in his
preface that his major goal is to fight what he fears has become the
conventional wisdom of sexual liberation and the denial of male and
female natures. If he is even half right in his observations, some
esteemed works may be basically nonsense. Whatever its faults,
Gilder's book is a useful antidote to the literature of unisex on the
one hand, and free sex, on the other.
Gilder does have an axe to grind, and this causes occasional
overstatement. The very nature of his message leads him to engage
in stereotyping on a grand scale. Furthermore, his theory about the
effect of the woman's control of abortion on the man's sexual identity is exceedingly speculative. to Even if one accepts the theory, the
policy implications are not clear unless one also believes with Gilder
that civilization is at risk. Unless that is indeed the case, abortion
restrictions merely transfer the man's problem (as Gilder sees it)
back to the woman. Here, I believe, is the rub in this book. Gilder
apparently wants women to submerge their vocational talents and
aspirations in the interests of family life, child rearing, and preservation of the male's sexual identity within the restraints of
marriage.
10. It is no simple matter to put a label on the abortion decisions as pro men or pro
women. Professor Mary Ann Glendon's ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW
( 1987) points out that the strongest supporters of abortion prior to Roe v. Wade were affluent
white men. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Gilder's viewpoint, but Glendon also
notes that more women than men supported the decision of the West German Constitutional
Court invalidating the 19741aw that allowed elective abortions within a specified time period.
She concludes that though Roe might therefore be regarded as a "masculine decision," it is
probably not. Rather, it "is more distinctively American than it is masculine in its lonely
individualism and libertarianism." /d. at 51-52. Professor Glendon unravels some of the
complexities of abortion regulation with insight and thoughtfulness.
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Charged with indifference to women's interests, Gilder would
reply that the female's true interests depend on allowing the male to
develop a healthy sexual identity. This will not sound strange to the
millions of women in this and past generations who have spent their
lives following the advice that Gilder offers. But sociology and economics tell us that if current trends threaten to dissolve the bonds
that check male aggression, we will have to find other ways to preserve those bonds. Today's small families do not occupy anyone's
full-time attention for more than a brief period. Even if the woman
happily accepts the role of mother in the home, she will naturally
seek other outlets eventually, and jobs are society's measures of
worth. In any event, women have been entering the workforce in
increasing numbers since 1964, and it was predictable that as oneearner families became two-earner families, living costs and new
minimum standards of the good life would rise to meet new income
levels. For most families, the choices Gilder urges are not realistically available. Still, it is not easy to resist the thought that Gilder
is on to something when one sees the divorce statistics, and the daily
reports linking the persistence of poverty and high crime rates to
single parent families. We can learn from Gilder even while rejecting some of his arguments and innuendoes.
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